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Abstract. We study a load balancing strategy, based on the price offe-
red by the base stations to the end-users who are willing to establish a
connection. The proposed scheme is compared with a pure load balancing
procedure, in a scenario comprising two different operators. We study the
impact of modifying the price offered by the base stations, in terms of
the achieved load balancing, as well as considering the revenue obtained
by the operators. Furthermore, we also enhance the two former access se-
lection schemes, by incorporating the willingness of reducing the number
of handovers, so as to analyze the impact over this particular parameter,
and over all the previous results. The whole work is conducted over a
proprietary event-based simulation tool, which offers the required degree
of flexibility and low computational overhead.
1 Introduction
It is now foreseen that the upcoming future of wireless communications will be
characterized by a wide range of network alternatives, managed by a relatively
large number of operators, allowing the user to use a vast set of services, with
different quality of service (QoS) and price levels. This, together with the recent
proliferation of devices and gadgets equipped with various technologies, brings
about new challenges and opportunities. From the perspective of the operators,
they would also need strategies so as to optimize the use of their deployed infra-
structure, not only at the high-load (peak traffic) situations, but also when the
demand is low, with the main goal of maximizing their revenues, while keeping
the service level agreements with the end-users.
It is now also believed that in this scenario the end-user would increase her
responsibility degree within the decision process. In this sense, she would select
those access alternatives which better suits her needs, on the basis of a number
of different parameters and her own preferences. In spite of the effort which
has been put by the wireless research community on some of these parameters,
most of the existing works focus on network conditions and the related physical
parameters. It can be also argued that other aspects, e.g. the price, might also
play a fundamental role in determining the satisfaction level of the end-user
when she accesses any service. Besides, it goes without saying that price also
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appears as a fundamental parameter for the operators, allowing them to define
strategies so as to increase their benefits.
This work proposes a dynamic price scheme aimed at achieving load balan-
cing between base stations, which might belong to the same or different opera-
tors. The end-user would consider additional merit parameters (mostly related
to the wireless realm we are tackling) to choose the base station to connect to,
establishing different access selection strategies, which are later compared.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses related work on price
strategies, positioning the presented approach against other proposals. Section
3 depicts the price-based load balancing and the corresponding access selection
strategies, which will be challenged in the scenario introduced in Section 4, which
also describes the tool which has been used to conduct the analysis. Results are
discussed in Section 5, while the paper is concluded in Section 6, which also
advocates some items which are left for future work.
2 Related Work
There exist a number of works which have proposed the integration of pricing
concepts to enhance access selection algorithms or as a way to develop strategies
to maximize operator revenues, while keeping end-user satisfaction levels.
On the first hand, we can identify a first group of works in which price is
part of the access selection algorithms. Amongst these, it is worth highlighting
the schemes based on game theory, which appears as one of the most used tools
when evaluating the best access alternatives to be selected by the end-user.
In the work by Niyato et al. [9], users compete for the resources offered by
the various wireless networks based on a utility function which depends on the
requested bandwidth and the connection price. Besides, the authors do not aim
at fostering load balancing between the involved networks, which might lead to
a degradation of the offered QoS, if some of the base stations gets overloaded.
In this sense, game theory can be also used so as to specifically address load
balancing; for instance, the authors in [1] tackle this problem, by setting out a
game where the base stations (players) aim at providing a more social behavior
(thus leading to a certain load balancing), rather than seeking their own benefit.
On the other hand, price-based load balancing has been frequently used in
fixed networks (see e.g. [7, 8]); in this case several price policies are proposed so as
to get the most appropriate QoS and load balancing. A drawback of these appro-
aches is that, since they target fixed networks, the corresponding algorithms do
not consider parameters which are intrinsic to wireless networks (e.g. handover).
In this sense, to our best knowledge, there are not many works in the related state
of the art whose main goal is load balancing based on price policies for wireless
networking scenarios. Some studies ([6, 11]) focus on load balancing over wireless
networks, but they do not use price in the proposed algorithms. Furthermore,
the proposals made in [3, 10] include price within the access selection schemes,
albeit their goal is not fostering load balancing between the base stations.
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One proposal which is close to the approach we follow in this work is the
one by Falowo et al. [5]. They define various service classes, whose prices are
updated based on the residual available capacity of each of the access elements,
establishing the maximum admissible rate to achieve the required load balancing.
In order to ensure that operator’s revenue does not decrease to unacceptable
levels, the price per service is maintained between some predefined thresholds.
As opposed to this latter work, we consider a multi-operator scenario, where
novel players might have different strategies so as to attract users, and thus
obtain a higher revenue.
3 Load Balancing Strategies
One of the main goals of this work is to analyze whether the operators might be
able to use their pricing strategies so as to reach an appropriate load balancing
between the deployed access elements. We would assume that end-users should be
able to access the available services on an automatic and transparent way, with-
out being limited by technological or administrative (operator-based) barriers,
and that base stations would modulate the offered price with the instantaneous
load, so that they can encourage or deter users from connecting depending on
the current available capacity. It is worth highlighting that we are assuming that
the end-users are not subscribed to either of operators involved in the analysis
and therefore they do not have any preference towards any of them. As such,
we can describe the scenario as an open market, where the costumers select the
alternative that offers the best overall utility.
In order to establish the price, we propose a piecewise function, as depicted
in Figure 1. In this sense, each of the access elements would use two thresholds.
When the available capacity is below Lthlower value, the access element set its
price to the maximum (pmax), so that to deter the end-user to connect to a highly
loaded base station; if it is above Lthupper value, the base station sets its price
to a minimum acceptable one, pmin (pmin = ψ · pmax, with ψ ∈ 〈0, 1]), since the
goal would be to ‘quickly’ convince the end-user to change to a low loaded base
station. Otherwise, a linear decreasing function is used, by means of which the
price is modulated with the currently carried load. In this sense, if the relative
load of a certain base station j was θj (i.e. its available relative capacity equals
1− θj), it would fix a price pj , as can be seen in Figure 1.
For the sake of generality, we assume that, in order to select the most appro-
priate access network, an end-user detects the set of available alternatives, those
which are within her coverage range, and sorts them based on a weighted linear
function, which can be tuned so as to consider various criteria. This approach is
rather generic and flexible and therefore it can be tailored so as to implement a
wide range of decision strategies. In particular, all of the detected access elements
are given a total score, by using:
Φi =
N∑
j=1
ωjfij (1)
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Fig. 1. Base station price as a function of current load
where Φi is the multi-criteria (aggregate) utility of access element i, ωj is the
weight of the jth criterion and fij is the value of the utility function of each of the
N criteria, as perceived by end-user if she connected to access element i. Finally,
the end-user selects the access alternative with the highest score, amongst those
with enough capacity to handle the current service request.
In [4], we presented a similar approach and we introduced a number of po-
tential figures of merit. All of them were modeled so as to get a value between 0
and 1, so by fixing
∑N
j=1 ωj = 1 we could bound Φi within the same interval. We
used criteria such as link quality, preferred operator, minimization of handovers
and load. In the framework of this work, we will use three different criteria,
which are briefly discussed below.
3.1 Price criterion
The goal of this criterion is to analyze the feasibility of using price as a means
to deter or encourage end-users to select a particular access alternative. From
the perspective of the operator, this would avoid saturating some base stations,
promoting the selection of less loaded alternatives. In this sense, we need to
include the offered price as another parameter to be considered during the access
selection procedure. With that idea in mind, we proposed in [4] a triangular
function; this has the disadvantage that the same absolute variation on the price
leads to the same change on the utility function, as opposed to a more sensible
approach, in which end-users would compare access alternatives based on the
relative difference between various prices. In order to overcome this limitation,
we have opted for a logarithmic function within this work, so as the offered price
(pi), which is within pmin and pmax,
1 gets a fair score in Eq. 1. Hence, the price
utility function Ai is defined as follows:
1 As can be seen in Figure 1, the offered price can vary within such interval.
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Ai = −log (pi) pmin ≤ pi ≤ pmax (2)
3.2 Handover criterion
From the perspective of the end-user it might seem very attractive to always
select the cheapest access alternative (thus taking decisions solely based on such
criterion); however, it is well know that changing base stations may also bring
about some overhead and QoS degradation. In this sense, the end-user might
be also tempted on maintaning the current base station as much as possible2.
It is worth highlighting that this criterion does not actually force the user to
necessarily keep the same base station, but it adds an additional value (σ) to
the overall utility, when the current access alternative (i) is the one the end-user
was previously connected to (BSi). This way, we define the handover utility
function Bi as:
Bi =
{
σ if end-user was connected to BSi
0 otherwise
(3)
3.3 Load criterion
This is possibly one of the aspects most favored by the network; the goal here is
to balance the load of the various base stations without taking into consideration
the particular operator they belong to. On a similar way that the price crite-
rion, in [4] we also proposed a triangular function to modulate the price based
on curent load; in the framework of this work we also consider the operator
willingness to encourage or deter the user from using a particular base station,
considering the load it is currently carrying. The goal is to offer the user a higher
utility when, being connected to a more loaded base station, she tries to change
to another one and, likewise, when the current base station is low loaded, to give
a lower utility so as to encourage her to maintain the same connection. In order
to model this behavior we use a potential function. If we define li as the current
relative load, we define the load utility function Γi as:
Γi = 1− l
2
i 0 ≤ li ≤ 1 (4)
3.4 Access selection strategies
In general, taking into account the previous discussions, the multi-criteria utility
function (Φi) can be expressed as follows.
2 We assume that while a service is being run, the end-user periodically senses her
environment so as to check whether a better access alternative is available, even
before she gets close to the coverage bound of the current base station.
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Strategy α β γ
Price Based Load Balancing (PBLB) 1.0 0.0 0.0
Enhanced PBLB (ePBLB) 0.5 0.5 0.0
Load Balancing (LB) 0.0 0.0 1.0
Enhanced LB (eLB) 0.0 0.5 0.5
Table 1. Access selection strategies
Φi = α ·Ai + β · Bi + γ · Γi (5)
where α, β and γ are the weights give to the price, handover and load criteria,
respectively, and we force them to sum up to 1.0.
By selecting different values for these weights, we can establish the access
selection strategies which are depicted in Table 1. Since the pure Load Balancing
(LB) strategy just favors load balancing, the goal is to compare the results
with those assessed with the proposed Price Based Load Balancing (PBLB),
which only favors the price parameter. The two enhanced versions (eLB and
ePBLB) are used in order to analyze the tradeoff between reducing the number
of handovers and achieving a better load balancing.
3.5 Price and handover criteria relationship
Assuming that the operator wants to establish a strategy based on price and
handover criteria, we will derive the σ value, which was previously defined (see
Eq. 3), so as to avoid that neither of the two criteria has a stronger impact
within the overall utility. In order to do so, we force the corresponding weights
(see Eq. 1) to equal ω, as shown below.
Φi = ω · Ai + ω · Bi (6)
In this sense, lets consider that an end-user is connected to a certain BSa,
paying a price Pa, and we would like to analyze the possibility of changing to
another BSb, since it offers a cheaper price. In particular, the price of the second
BS has a reduction of χ (100 ·χ%) over the one offered by the current active one
Pb = (1 − χ) · Pa. Evaluating expression (6) at BSa we can obtain:
Φa = ω · (−log (Pa)) + ω · σP (7)
Likewise, for BSb, since it implies a handover from BSa, we can write:
Φb = ω · (−log (Pb)) (8)
If we take the limit situation, and we make both scores equal, so as to es-
tablish the σP value which would lead to a handover situation, yielding that
σP = −log (1− χ). As a design decision, we will assume that an end-user would
change the access alternative when it is 20% cheaper than the current one
(χ = 0.20). By substituting in the aformention expression, we obtain that σP
equals 0.10.
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Fig. 2. Load hyperbolic function
3.6 Load and handover criteria relationship
In this case, we assume that the operator wants to use a strategy based only on
load and handover criteria. Following a similar analysis than the one which was
previously carried out, when the end-user is connected to a certain BSa, whose
current relative load is La, the corresponding utility can be obtained as follows:
Φa = ω · σL + ω ·
(
1− L2a
)
(9)
Besides, for BSb, since it implies a handover from BSa, we can write:
Φb = ω ·
(
1− L2b
)
(10)
When both Φa and Φb are the same value (limit situation) we can write an
hyperbola equation, as can be seen below.
L2a
σL
−
L2b
σL
= 1 (11)
Figure 2 shows the curves which are obtained for different σL values (from
0.1 to 0.5). These establish the areas (considering the loads of two base stations,
the current one and another potential destination) in which the end-user would
take the decision of changing her access. In this sense, all combinations below a
particular curve would make the end-user to change to the other base station.
The straight line (σL = 0) can be seen as the limit (when handover is not
considered within the utility function). Since its behavior is sensible we have
selected (as a design parameter) that σL = 0.1.
4 Simulator and Scenario
In order to evaluate the strategies proposed in the previous section, we have
used the proprietary simulator multi-Constraint Access Selection in heteroge-
neous Environments (mCASE), whose architecture and detailed operation were
discussed in [4]. mCASE uses a discrete capacity unit, the so called Traffic Unit
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Fig. 3. Network deployment used during the analysis
Operator ID Coverage (m) Capacity (TUs) # Base Stations
Traditional ρ0 600 20 4
Novel ρ1 600 20 2
Table 2. Involved technologies
(TU), which affects both the capacity required by the different services which are
started by the end-users as well as the capacity of the different access elements.
The analysis will be carried out over a scenario comprising a number of
base stations of a single technology (mimicking a legacy cellular deployment), as
depicted in Table 2. We further assume that there exist two operators; the first
one might be matched to a traditional operator, with a slightly larger deployment
(in terms of the number of base stations), while the second one might resemble a
novel operator which tries to get market share with a more aggresive price strate-
gy, albeit having a smaller infrastructure. In addition, we consider a square area
of 1000 m side, in which the base stations are deployed without any particular
previous planning (although limiting the minimum distance between them, when
they belong to the same operator). The particular network deployment which
will be analyzed is shown in Figure 3.
250 users are randomly deployed within the same area and afterwards they
move following a Random Waypoint model [2], with a pedestrian speed, ran-
domly selected within the interval [1, 3] (m/s). Each of the end-users would
start services by means of an ON-OFF model in which both the inter-arrival
and service times are modeled with negative exponential random variables, with
means 120 and 60 seconds, respectively. We assume that the required capacity
for the services requested by the end-users equals 1 TU.
We also define a generic monetary unit, as the amount of money a end-user
needs to pay per TU and per second. Since the service we are using in this work
requires 1 TU (as was discussed in the above paragraph), a particular call of x
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Fig. 4. Access selection strategies performance from user point of view
seconds would have a cost of x · p, where p is the current price (in the defined
monetary units) offered by the selected base station.
5 Discussion of results
In this section we describe the results which were obtained when using the four
access selection strategies which have been presented in Table 1. All the simula-
tion runs last 3600 seconds, and 100 independent executions are carried out per
case, so as to ensure the statistical validity of the results. These can be grouped
according to whether they affect more the end-user or the network operators.
Figure 4 focuses on these parameters which allow getting an idea on the perfor-
mance perceived by the end-users, while Figure 5 shows a set of results which
can be used to yield the benefits that the various strategies might bring about
to the two operators.
We assume that the traditional operator does not change its price/capacity
function, but we vary the maximum price of the novel operator, as a percentage
of the one used by the traditional operator. In this sense, we define the price
factor (α) as:
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α =
(pmax)novel
(pmax)traditional
(12)
In particular, we increase α from 0.1 (where the maximum price of the novel
operator is 10% of the traditional one) to 1.0, where the two operators use the
same price strategy, as showed in Figure 13.
First of all, Figure 4(a) shows the probability for any call to be successful.
The first conclusion is that this parameter is not highly affected by the value of
α, since the successful probability remains stable for all α values, showing (for
all cases) a rather appropriate behavior (≥ 0.995). PBLB appears as the only
case which slightly goes away the optimum performance assessed with the rest of
strategies, although the decrease is almost negligible (0.5%). Therefore, with the
parameters of this particular network deployment, the call failure probability is,
for all cases, rather low, thus showing an acceptable QoS for all the strategies.
In the two enhanced versions of the load balancing access selection strategies,
we included the minimization of handovers as another criterion to be considered
in the multi-criteria utility function. In order to analyze its effect, Figure 4(b)
shows the average number of handovers which were required per call. As can
be seen, the figure does not show a relevant influence of α over this parameter,
as it also happened with the successful call probability. However, in this case,
the figure yields a clear difference between the various strategies. In the LB,
the number of handovers per call stays around 2.0, which somehow can reflect
a ping-pong effect, consequence of the load balancing goal. When reduction of
handovers is considered in the multi-criteria utility function (eLB), the impact
appears very clearly, as the number of handovers per call is reduced to around
0.4. Regarding the PBLB, we can see that the average number of handovers
is slightly above 1.0, which gets reduced to below 0.5 when the reduction of
handovers is considered in the multi-criteria utility function (ePBLB).
Opposed to the two previous parameters, we might have expect that the
average price per call, which is shown in Figure 4(c), would be influenced by the
α parameter, since it gathers the price the novel operator is charging for accessing
its base stations. The increase for those strategies which do not consider price
(LB and eLB) follows a linear trend, being both of them alike. For the two
strategies which consider price (PBLB, ePBLB), service price is clearly affected
by the α parameter. In this case, the strategy which leads to the cheapest prices
is the ePBLB, while the strategy which only favors the price criterion (PBLB)
leads to a slightly higher service price.
With respect to the parameters which reflect the performance from the ope-
rator perspective, Figures 5(a) and 5(b) show the relative load (ratio between
the used and the available resources), while Figures 5(c) and 5(d) correspond to
the revenue that the two operators get from each of their deployed base stations.
In the case of the two strategies which do not consider price (LB, eLB), load
does not get affected by the α parameter and, as can be seen, they both reach
an almost ideal load balancing (relative loads are more or less the same for
3 In all cases, pmax for the traditional operator was set to 1.0 monetary units.
A price based load balancing scheme for wireless access networks 11
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
α
R
el
at
iv
e 
lo
ad
 
 
PBLB
LB
ePBLB
eLB
(a) Novel operator load
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
α
R
el
at
iv
e 
lo
ad
 
 
PBLB
LB
ePBLB
eLB
(b) Traditional operator load
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
2
4
6
8
10
12
α
R
ev
en
ue
 p
er
 B
S
 
 
PBLB
LB
ePBLB
eLB
(c) Novel operator revenue
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
2
4
6
8
10
12
α
R
ev
en
ue
 p
er
 B
S
 
 
PBLB
LB
ePBLB
eLB
(d) Traditional operator revenue
Fig. 5. Access selection strategies performance from operator point of view
both operators). However, for the two other strategies (PBLB and ePBLB) the
results yield a tight relationship with the α parameter. In this sense, when the
novel operator is offering cheap prices (i.e. α is small), the relative load of the
traditional operator is quite low (< 0.6), while it reaches values close to 0.95 for
the novel operator. Furthermore, as α increases, the relative load of the novel
operator gets lower, augmenting for the traditional one. This effect could have
been expected, since an increase in α really means that the prices offered by the
novel operator are closer to the traditional operator ones. It is worth saying that
when α is high (> 0.9), the results (in terms of load balancing) equals the ones
achieved with the pure load balancing strategies.
Finally, it could be argued that the most relevant results are those related
with the revenue obtained by the operators. It is worth recalling that the price
strategy of the traditional operator is the same for all α values (pmax = 1.0) and,
therefore, for those two access selection methods which do not consider price (LB,
eLB), its revenue does not change with α; however, for the novel operator, we
can see (for these two strategies) a linear increase, which corresponds to the same
trend in the maximum price used by the corresponding base stations. On the
other hand, when price is considered within the access selection strategy (PBLB
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and ePBLB), there is a clear impact on the two operators’ revenue. For the
traditional one, the revenue always increases with α; the reason is that the more
expensive the novel operator is, the more end-users would select the traditional
alternative (as it was also reflected in the load results - see Figure 5(b)). Besides,
Figure 5(c) yields that the novel operator does not perceive significant additional
gain when α > 0.7; in this case there is a tradeoff between the reduction of the
load and the price users are paying. Furthermore, when users try to keep the
same base station as much as possible (introducing handover reduction in the
access selection strategy, ePBLB) we can see how the novel operator obtains
some additional benefit, as opposed to the traditional one (this is only relevant
when α is higher than 0.6).
6 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed a load balancing scheme, based on the price offered by
the base stations, which adjust it according to their current available capacity
so as to deter or encourage more users to connect to them. We have shown that,
only with the information about the connected users, the proposed method offers
a good performance, compared to a pure load balancing strategy. A scenario
comprising two operators (both traditional and incumbent/novel) has been used.
We have studied the impact of establishing different prices for the case of the
novel operator, as opposed to the traditional one, whose pricing policies have
always remained the same. We have also analyzed the impact of such variation
on the revenues obtained by the two operators, as well as on the goodness of the
achieved load balancing. The results yield that the load of the novel operator is
higher as its offered prices are cheaper, but this does not however lead to the
maximum revenues.
All the analysis have been conducted over a proprietary event-based simulator
tool, which, thanks to its flexibility and low computational overhead, has allowed
the execution of a large number of independent runs, ensuring the statistical
validity of the results. In addition, the two former strategies were also enhanced,
by introducing another parameter of merit during the access selection procedure.
In this sense, the results proved that incorporating a certain willingness to reduce
the number of handovers was very effective.
The proposed mechanism and the employed tool have been both conceived
with the idea of allowing a wider range of studies. We will, for instance, study
how different types of users (i.e. business), who are willing to pay more for having
a better service can also benefit from the proposed pricing strategy. In addition,
we will also incorporate more parameters in the access selection procedure, like
the preference to connect to a certain operator, and the penalization which base
stations would impose to those end-users who do not have an agreement with
the corresponding operator. The analysis will be also enriched by considering
heterogeneous technologies.
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